Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals by Stoll, Richard C. et al.
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 4 Article 4
1939
Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals
Richard C. Stoll
Henry E. McElwain
Harry B. Mackoy
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Courts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law Journal by
an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stoll, Richard C.; McElwain, Henry E.; and Mackoy, Harry B. (1939) "Practice and Procedure in the Court of Appeals," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 27 : Iss. 4 , Article 4.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol27/iss4/4
NOTES
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN THE COURT OF
APPEALS
Few courts in our country have been called upon to do more
work in recent years than the Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
The large number of appeals coming before it, the practice of
writing opinions in all cases and the earnest desire of members
of the Court to maintain their standards of quality, have pro-
duced a situation which demands the thoughtful consideration of
the people of this state.
At the annual meeting of the State Bar Association in 1938,
Chief Justice Stites called attention to the difficulties confronting
the Court in the disposition of cases. He gave figures which
showed that, unless conditions could be improved, there was apt
to be a diminishing amount of time to devote to records and
briefs, with a resulting danger of ill-considered decisions. There
would be, he said, no chance for relief unless some solution could
be found for the Court's problems.
As a result of Judge Stites's address, a resolution was passed
by the State Bar Association authorizing the president to appoint
a committee of three members "to confer with the members of
the Court of Appeals and the Clerk; to make such other investi-
gation as may be necessary and proper; and to report its
finding and recommendations to the Board of Bar Commis-
sioners." The president of the State Association appointed
Judge Richard C. Stoll, of Lexington, Mr. Henry E. McElwain,
of Louisville, and Mir. Harry B. Mfackoy, of Covington, to serve
on such a Committee, Mr. Mfackoy being designated as chairman.
The following resume of the Committee's activities, and its
recommendations should be of interest to all lawyers in the State:
STATEMENT OF TIE COMMITTEE
Gentlemen:
The Committee, since it was appointed, has made two reports
containing recommendations which, under guidance of the Court
NOTES
of Appeals and with its cooperation, have brought about the fol-
lowing helpful changes:
1. The rules of the Court have been revised in certain respects,
so as to clarify procedure, to facilitate and expedite the handling of
appeals, and to protect the Clerk in the care of records and collection
of costs. The revised rules were published in the docket for the Fall
term of the Court of Appeals.
2. An index system has been devised and installed, whereby all
cases are now numbered and a record of them kept in such manner that
the condition of the docket and status of cases thereon can be easily
ascertained by the Judges, the Clerk and the Sergeant at Arms.
Steps are being taken to furnish more adequate filing facil-
ities for the safe-guarding and preservation of records in the
Clerk's office, which hitherto have not been kept in fire-proof
receptacles.
The Committee is, likewise, expecting to prepare and present
to the next regular session of the General Assembly a bill to
provide a law clerk for each Judge and Commissioner of the
Court of Appeals, which clerk shall be required to possess such
education and experience as will enable him to render real
assistance in the consideration of records and briefs so that
opinions may be more rapidly prepared.
A suggestion having been made that an intermediate appel-
late court be established, which would have final jurisdiction in
certain kinds of cases, the Committee has given careful thought
to the advisability and feasibility of this step. However, the
desirability of such a court appears to be controversial and
demands an extensive investigation of methods and results in
the states where intermediate courts exist. Furthermore, in
order to secure such legislation, it will be necessary to have an
amendment to the Constitution, which, judging from past
experience, is difficult to obtain.
Under these circumstances, the Committee has turned its
attention to the possibility of effecting desired changes in
practice and procedure through rules of court. In its last report
to the Board of Bar Commissioners the Committee recommended
the study of such a plan, and authority was given to so proceed.
The result of those studies is now submitted for consideration.
The recent adoption of new Rules of Civil Procedure in the
Federal Courts has stimulated and revived interest in this
question, but it is by no means new to either the courts or lawyers
of our country. For many years there have been direct and
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indirect attempts to confirm or grant the power. Some courts
have in fact taken the position that they had the inherent right
to function under self-made regulations, and without interference
from executive or legislative powers. A recent writer 1 says that
for five hundred years the British courts developed in that
manner. It was only during the later half of the 18th century,
when life began to be more complex with the coming of the
Industrial Revolution, that "the clumsy machinery of the courts
was generally recognized as being out of date". And in the
following century, through the efforts of the learned Jeremy
Bentham and other distinguished jurists, there was a reform
which the judges themselves sponsored. The Judicature Acts of
1833, 1852, and 1873 were all framed so as to recognize the
right of "the courts themselves to make rules of procedure,
uniform for all courts".
In our country the prevailing practice has been otherwise.
The author just quoted explains the reasons for this difference
as follows :2
"In the United States, until recently, the policy has been to pre-
scribe rules of practice by legislative enactment. * * * the courts in
England were integrated at the time the American Bar was being
formed, but in this country, from the beginning, lawyers were, in
common with the American character, highly individualistic. In their
development of our system of courts and judicial administration, their
efforts and activities were carried on in that manner. As soon as
independence from the mother country was established, the lawyers
who reached positions on the bench and who were elected to legislative
bodies took charge of the development of our judicial system. That in
America, alone among all the English-speaking countries of the world,
despite our emphasis upon constitutional division of powers, procedure
in the courts was regulated by legislative enactment, is a paradox for
historians to ponder."
To such an extent has this legislative influence been mani-
fested that in some states provision has been made in their
constitutions for a Code to be formulated by the law-making
body rather than by the Supreme Court. As a result, in New
York State, where such a constitution was adopted in 1846,3
the practice, pleading and procedure were required to be fixed
by the legislature (the "Field Code" was adopted in 1848).
Later in the states of Indiana, Ohio and Wisconsin similar
1
"A Task for the Rule-making Authority of North Carolina" by
Frank B. Winslow, American Bar Association Journal. August, 193S,
page 647, etc.
- Same as Note 1 above, page 648.
New York Constitution, 1846, Article VI, Section 8.
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action was taken, so in those states they have had legislative
Codes (adopted in 1852, 1853 and 1856, respectively) partly
because there has been a constitutional limitation upon the rule-
making power of the courts. And in the statutes of those states
such a restriction has to be taken into account in conferring this
power. For instance in a proposed Act recently drafted by the
Committee on Procedure of the Ohio State Bar Association to
confer the power on the Supreme Court of that state, is the fol-
lowing provision: "Nothing in this act shall abridge the right
of the legislature to enact, modify or repeal statutes or rules
relating to pleading, practice and procedure".
This policy of having court procedure regulated by legisla-
tors has frequently resulted in a patchwork of confused rules, or
has permitted a small group of lawyers, who were not elected
because of special competence in the field of judicial administra-
tion, to become the rule-making authority. The members of
law-making bodies who have not been legally trained have left
the determination of all questions involving the courts to those
who are presumably qualified. Unfortunately, the men so
delegated have not often had experience in such matters, have
not held office with any continuity, and have frequently been
lacking in competent advisers. The result has been that the
courts of the United States have been greatly behind those of
England in the efficient disposition of their calendars.4 Con-
sequently, they have been criticized for delays, for faulty
opinions and for causing cumbersome and expensive litigation,
when these conditions have not always been their fault. Such
situations have arisen simply because courts are being forced to
work with antiquated tools, furnished by a totally different
department of the government, without a fair opportunity to
meet the problems confronting them.
It does not seem possible to state exactly when the various
states began to seriously consider the need for having the rule-
making power reposed in the courts. There appear to have been
considerable confusion and uncertainty as to the distinction
between rules of practice and those relating to procedure or
pleading. Most of the early constitutions and legislative acts
which attempted to grant or confirm the power apparently
related to questions of practice. These were intended to govern
'Same as Note 1 above, page 648, etc.
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"the dispatch of the courts' business", such as the manner of
filing papers, making arguments, preservation of discipline, and
similar details. They were looked upon as necessary to the
preservation of the court's dignity and integrity and to expedite
the hearing and decision of cases. In fact, as we have indicated,
some courts assumed the right to prescribe rules of this character
as a part of their inherent power, and later the right was
recognized by statute. Such was the case in Alabama, where the
Supreme Court announced its power to make such rules as far
back as 18385, although the Legislature did not confirm that
stand until 1923, at which time it also granted the court "full
plenary power * * * to adopt such other rules to regulate the
practice and proceeding in all courts of the state, or such
modifications of existing rules as they may deem proper."
At least as far back as 1875 certain states began to give their
supreme courts the power to make rules of procedure, as well as
those of practice. In that year Missouri by its constitution
specifically vested the power in its Supreme Court to "have a
general superintending control over all inferior courts."0 In 1879
the Connecticut legislature passed an act granting the Judges of
the Superior Court power to make all such orders and rules as
should-be necessary and proper to give full effect to the earlier
Act to Simplify Procedure in Civil Causes7 By constitutional
enactment in 1889 the State of Idaho conferred the rule-making
power on its Supreme Court as to procedure in that court.8
From that time to the present there has been a steady trend in
the direction of greater amplification of such powers, as well as
an increasing number of states where the powers have been
created either by constitution or statute or upon the basis of the
courts' inherent rights.
The language of the earlier, as well as some of the later, pro-
visions in both state constitutions and statutes was occasionally
rather guarded, and it was not always possible to determine
whether the power conferred by them was applicable to practice
and procedure, or to practice alone. For instance in New
Mexico, which now has a modern and up-to-date law, the
"The Rule-making Power of the Courts in the Several States",
Issued in 1927 by the Committee of the Conference of Bar Association
Delegates of the American Bar Association, page 5.
6 Same as Note 5 above, page 65.
'Idem, page 17.
8 ldem, page 27.
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language of Section 4258, of its Statutes Codification of 1915,
simply provided that:
"The Justices of the Supreme Court, and until they act, the Judges
of the District Courts, respectively, may make such rules as may be
necessary and applicable to proceedings under the provisions of this
chapter."
Under such acts, or similar ones, many courts did not pro-
ceed very far in the adoption of rules. In a few jurisdictions it
would appear that the judges did not want to exercise the powers
conferred, or did not have a clear conception of their duties and
rights. It is possible that in others there was not the machinery
to properly formulate new rules or to revise the old ones. These
conditions have now been met in several states by the establish-
ment of Procedural Rules Committees, which occasionally possess
secretarial staffs. Such committees are in some instances created
by statute, but are more frequently appointed by the courts.
Quite often the Judicial Council, where such a body exists,
functions as such a committee. It has been through them, and
with the intelligent assistance of various state bar associations,
that the movement has been growing for a still greater extension
of the rule-making power of the courts.
As a result of this movement, in 1926, at the Denver meeting
of the Conference of Bar Delegates of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, a resolution was adopted, providing for the creation of a
new committee of the Conference, to be known as the Committee
on the Rule-Mlaking Power of the Courts. That Committee
under the leadership of Josiah Marvel, leader of the Delaware
Bar, and comprising in its membership such men as Roscoe
Pound, of Harvard, and Edson R. Sunderland, of the University
of Michigan, made an exhaustive study of the subject. It may be
well to quote some of the conclusions which they reached and the
reasons given for their conclusions.9
As to the main objective, Professor Sunderland says: "The
regulation of legal procedure under the control of the courts, has
the double purpose of saving the public from the burden of an
utterly inadequate system of justice, and of rescuing the pro-
fession from the undeserved charge of responsibility for that
inadequacy * While we have welcomed and encouragd the
services of experts in every other field, we have never permitted
IAmerican Bar Association Journal, Part II, No. 3, Vol. 13,
page 1, etc.
K. L. J.-5
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legal experts to control the complex machinery of our courts."
On the other hand, "new tribunals supplementing the courts,
whether strictly judicial, or partly administrative, have in almost
every instance enjoyed the benefit of regulation by those who
are specialists in the work."
Comparing our country with England, Charles S. Cushing
writes: "During the long history of English law, Parliament
has at no time attempted to enact a full legislative code of
procedure * * * The restrictions (in this country) on the
Courts are those of a by-gone era and, I submit, have been dis-
credited by experience".
Another member with a similar name, Charles S. Cutting,
comments: "When one considers the care with which the great
departments of our government, both.federal and state, are sepa-
rated, each one of which is, as far as may be, independent of the
other, we may well wonder how it ever came about that the legis-
lative and the executive so far trespassed upon the prerogatives
of the courts as to prescribe the rules relating the pleading,
practice and procedure of the courts themselves."
Professor Pound's remarks are too voluminous to quote, but
he stresses the increased flexibility, the greater expedition and
the more sympathetic interpretation of the law by a court which
can regulate its own procedure. "No one", he states, "is so well
qualified as the judiciary to determine what experience requires
and how rules are working."
Chairman Marvel himself dwells largely on the advantages
of the English court procedure, where "we see a Rules Com-
mittee clothed with the power and responsibility of keeping them
abreast with the growth of the substantive law." On the other
hand in more than half the states of our country we see an iron
hand reaching out "from the state capitals to command in what
manner the administration of justice may proceed". "I con-
cede", Mr. Marvel adds, "the right of the Legislative branches
of Government to say what Courts may do, but I object when
they attempt to say how the Courts shall do it."
The foregoing quotations have been given in order to show
how the foremost men of the bar are regarding this important
subject, and to explain the reasons for studying it. Arthur T.
'Vanderbuilt, president of the American Bar Association last
NOTES
year, in an address at the Cleveland meeting, July 6, 1938,10
listed the granting or confirming of the rule-making power to
higher courts in six states as one of three major improvements
in the administration of justice within a ten-year period. And
the new president of that Association, Mr. Frank J. Hogan, has
just appointed in every state special committees on Procedural
Reform, which committees are expected to take up this question
as the first and most vital matter for their consideration. In his
letter of appointment the president says:
"If the highest court of your state does not now possess the rule-
making power, I suggest that the greatest service your Committee could
render would be to have your legislature pass an act conferring that
power on your court of last resort".
The gentlemen appointed to the Procedural Reform Com-
mittee for Kentucky are those already serving on the State
Docket Committee and the following:
Robert T. Caldwell, Ashland
Charles I. Dawson, Louisville
Frank Ml. Drake, Louisville
Shelley D. Rouse, Covington
Mae Swinford, Cynthiana
Simeon S. Willis, Ashland
Mr. Mackoy has been designated by Mr. Hogan to act as
Chairman of his committee.
Despite the foregoing indorsements of prominent jurists, it
has seemed wise to your committee, as a part of its investigation,
to verify to some extent the statements which have been made
concerning the need for granting or confirming the rule-making
power to the courts and to ascertain the results accomplished
thereby. Accordingly, first-hand information has been sought in
the states where the power has been exercised. This has been
done through letters and questionnaires addressed to secretaries
of state bar associations, lawyers and clerks of the courts. In the
somewhat limited time at its disposal, the committee has not been
able to exhaust the sources of information, but the results may
be briefly summarized as follows.
Fifteen states have been definitely reported as functioning
under such a plan, and eleven of them have responded to our
' Journal of American Judicature Society, Vol. 22, No. 3, October,
1938, page 117.
KENTUCKY LAW JoupNAL
inquiries. In all of the latter the power to make rules has
apparently been confined to matters of practice and procedure
and does not cover pleading. In one of the eleven, South Dakota,
though the power has been recognized as being inherent in the
courts, it had not yet been exercised up to December 31, 1938.11
The sources of the power are said to be legislative in nine
states; both constitutional and legislative in two; inherent in the
courts in one; and of doubtful origin in one.
In eight of the states the rules promulgated have been
suggested or formulated by a committee, which has usually been
appointed by the state bar association or the court; and in two
instances the rules have been formulated on the court's own
motion. In South Dakota, as stated above, there had been no
rules announced up to December 31, 1938, but it was said they
would be "about January 1". They were being prepared by a
Code Commission of three members created by act of the Legisla-
ture in 1937.
As to the results, in all but three states the lawyers and
judges were reported to be pleased with the exercise of the rule-
making power by the courts, and in the remaining three the
opposition or criticism directed towards it had been negligible.
The attitude of most members of the legal profession is expressed
by the Secretary of the New Mexico Association, who writes
that: "The bench and bar generally favor the exercise of this
power. Occasionally some lawyer has a complaint". The com-
mittee has been advised of only one case where the opposition
took an aggressive stand. In Wisconsin an action was brought
to test the validity of the Act conferring the power, but the Act
was upheld.12
The committee has felt that special consideration should be
given to the situation existing in our own state of Kentucky, in
order to ascertain the need for the rule-making power in the
Court of Appeals, and to determine the possibility of securing
legislation to grant or confirm it, if necessary. A careful study
u Since the date mentioned, Judge Van Buren Perry, of South
Dakota, Chairman of the Committee on Rules of the Judicial Council
of that State, has shown us the first proofs of revised codes to be
submitted to the Code Commission, which will in turn report them to
the Supreme Court of South Dakota, to be acted upon by the next
legislature. These codes constitute a most important and valuable
achievement.
-In re Constitutionality of Statute Empowering Supreme Court to
Promulgate Rules, etc., 204 Wis. 501, 236 N. W. 717 (1931).
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of the question was made by the Efficiency Commission of our
state in 1923, and its report on the Judiciary, published Decem-
ber 31st of that year, contains some valuable suggestions.
Referring to the relative merits of legislative or judicial control
of procedure, it said :13
"Speaking broadly, the legislative method has failed, whereas the
judicial method, through rules of court, has been highly successful.
In a majority of the States of the Union there has been incessant
criticism of procedural rules, both in code States and in common law
States, and constant tinkering by legislatures. The British experience
has been quite the opposite; under judicial power, exercised by well
qualified committees of judges, procedure has undergone a steady
evolution toward its highest purpose, that of affording a simple, direct,
and speedy route to justice."
A further examination of the subject was made in 1927 by
Mr. William W. Crawford, of the Louisville Bar, a former presi-
dent of the Kentucky State Bar Association, and the conclusions
which he reached have been exceedingly helpful to the com-
mittee.14 The Court of Appeals itself, however, has in the past
two and a half years thrown more light on the matter than was
available to either the Efficiency Commission or Mr. Crawford.
This has been done not only through decisions of the Court, but
in its statements elsewhere, such as the remarks of Judge Stites
before the Judicial Council on November 10, 1938.
In an opinion handed down June 16, 1938,15 the Court of
Appeals has summarized its views as to the rule-making power
in clear and concise language:
"Section 109 of the State Constitution vests the 'judicial power' of
the Commonwealth 'in the senate when sitting as a court of impeach-
ment, and one supreme court (to be styled the court of appeals) and
the courts established by this Constitution'. The separation of thejudicial power from the executive power and the legislative power was
not merely a matter of convenience. The three branches of government
are co-ordinate and yet each, within the administration of its own
affairs, Is supreme. The grant of the judicial power to the courts carries
with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective
in the ad nist ration of justice under the Constitution. Capps v. Gore,
231 Ky. 185, 21 S. W. (2d) 266; Commonwealth ex rel., etc. v. Harring-
ton, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. (2d) 53; In re Sparks, 267 Ky. 93; 101 S. W.
(2d) 194. Rules of practice and procedure are, fundamentally, matters
within the judicial power and subject to the control of the courts in the
' "The Judiciary of Kentucky, A Report by the Efficiency Com-
mission of Kentucky", Advance Pamphlet VII, December 21, 1923,
page 80.
" "The Rule-making Power of the Courts in the Several States,
supra, page 38.
I- Burton, et al. v. Mayer, et al., 274 Ky. 263, 118 S. W. (2d) 547,
549 (1938).
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administration of justice. The courts accept legislative cooperation in
rendering the judiciary more effective. They deny the right of legis-
lative dominance in matters of this kind."
It will be observed that, while in the above statement the
court emphasized the inherent right of that body to control the
administration of justice, it also said that it would "accept
legislative cooperation in rendering the judiciary more effective".
In his address to the Judicial Council Judge Stites approved the
suggestion that the State Legislature should do as the Federal
Congress has already done and place the responsibility for civil
procedure in the hands of the Court of Appeals. Such a step
would assure cooperation between the two branches of govern-
ment, just as it was accomplished when the integrated bar was
established. In that case, it will be remembered by those lawyers
who worked to bring about integration that, while the Court of
Appeals then recognized its inherent power to organize and
regulate the Bar, it desired first to have the General Assembly
pass an Act confirming such power so that there might be such
cooperation.
It is believed that these conclusions of the Court of Appeals
represent the considered judgment of able jurists in Kentucky
extending over a period of eighty years.16 There are other
reasons, however, why it will be desirable to proceed both through
legislative act and rules of court to revise our civil procedure.
Kentucky's present Civil Code was first enacted in 1851, being
modeled after that of the State of New York. It was attempted
in that work to embody all the adjective law relating to practice,
procedure and pleading. Since then, however, there have been
adjective provisions enacted which have improperly crept into
the Statutes of our state, and, on the other hand, there have been
substantive provisions that belong in the Statutes which have
been wrongly placed in the Code. The dividing line between
these different provisions is sometimes difficult to define, and, in
order to perform the task satisfactorily, it will be necessary to
carefully and systematically proceed to segregate the substantive
from the adjective. This should be and no doubt can be brought
l See Kennedy and Brother v. Cunningham, 59 Ky. (2 Metcalfe)
538, 541 (1859); In re R. W. Wooley, 74 Ky. (11 Bush) 95, 111-112
(1875); Capps v. Gore, 231 Ky. 185, 21 S. W. (2d) 266 (1929); Common-
wealth ex rel. Ward v. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41, 98 S. W. (2d) 53 (1936);
and later disbarment cases.
NOTES
about through the sincere and intelligent cooperation of the
judicial and the legislative departments.
Fortunately, our state's procedure in civil cases has been
remarkably well handled as compared with other jurisdictions.
The following comment of the Efficiency Commission on that
topic is well-deserved :'7
"It is in order to say that Kentucky has been exceptionally for-
tunate in the operation of its code of civil procedure. As first written
it gave a great scope for efficient judicial administration compared
with the archaic body of procedural law which it succeeded. The most
remarkable fact, probably, and one difficult to match in any other
State, is that the code has been in operation seventy-two years and has
been but little tampered with. It has fortunately escaped the long
succession of unskilled amendments which, in many states, have marked
the degeneration of this field of law. It should be said further that the
Kentucky code has, to an unexampled degree, been wisely and under-
standingly construed by the highest Court so that it has not suffered
the perversion which has befallen similar codes in other States."
In our opinion the hour has come, however, when it is
desirable and proper to urge the confirmation of the rule-making
power in the Court of Appeals, in order to help provide the
relief which that court is demanding and which lawyers them-
selves are beginning to feel is important for their own advantage.
It will not only simplify procedure, it will save time, labor and
expense. Records will be made less voluminous; volumes of
reports may be less numerous and therefore less costly.
By proper rules the whole system of practice may be-made more
efficacious and expeditious. When wrong, the trouble can be
easily and quickly rectified; and if such is not the result, the
responsibility will be that of the court where it rightfully
belongs. Moreover, the General Assembly will be relieved of a
task, about which most of its members know little, and care less.
It is opportune that the Bar Association take this step now,
because, as many members will remember, the Statutes Com-
mission, for the creation of which the Association may claim
credit, is at present engaged in a revision of our statutes.
As part of its work, the Commission has already made a thorough
check and tabluation of the sections in the Statutes and the
Codes (Criminal as well as Civil) which should be transferred
from one to the other, or which might be consolidated one with
the other, or which it might be wise to repeal. It happens that
the Chairman of the Docket Committee is likewise a member of
"' "The Judiciary of Kentucky, etc.", supra, pages 80-81.
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the Statutes Commission, and he can assure the Committee that
the results of the Commission's investigations and all its
facilities will be available in the proposed legislation or in any
subsequent program of the Committee.
As to the bill itself, since there are no constitutional prohibi-
tions or limitations, there can be no difficulty in its preparation.
Our Federal Congress has furnished an excellent model in the
very simple Act under which the Supreme Court was given
power to prescribe general rules for the District Courts of the
United States.' s That act did not provide for a procedural rules
committee, but the Supreme Court appointed such a committee,
to formulate the rules adopted and promulgated by the Court.
In some of the states provision is made in the law for such an
advisory committee, which is in a few instances the -Judicial
Council of the state. It is the Docket Committee's belief that
the plan whereby the Federal Rules were prepared is the better
one. Furthermore, it is thought that a committee appointed by
the Court of Appeals will be more satisfactory to the lawyers,
since that Court and the Bar Association will, as in the past,
continue to strive for the best interests of the bench, the legal
profession and the people of the State.
RicHARD C. STOLL
HENRY E. MCELWAIN ,DoCKET COMMITTEE
HARRY B. MVACKOY,
Chairman
The Act passed by Congress in 1934 reads in substance as follows,
viz.:
"Be It Enacted:
1. That the Supreme Court of the United States shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules, for the District Courts of the
United States, the forms of process, writs, pleadings and motions,
and the practice and procedure in civil actions at law. Said rules
shall neither abridge, enlarge, nor modify the substantive rights
of any litigant. They shall take effect six months after their
promulgation, and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be
of no further force or effect.
2. The court may at any time unite the general rules pre-
scribed by it for cases in equity with those in actions in law so as
to secure one form of civil action and procedure for both; Provided,
however, that in such union of rules the right of trial by jury as
at common law, and as guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of
the Constitution shall be preserved to the parties inviolate. Such
united rules shall not take effect until they shall have been reported
to Congress at the beginning of a regular session, and until after
the close of such session."
